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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
SHERMANS. DALTON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
INDUSTRIAL CO,MMISSION OF UTAH
WAYNE RASMUSSEN COMPANY, and

Case No.
8943

GUARANTEEINSURANCECO~ANY

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident which
occurred on February 13, 1955, while he was driving a
car from Rock Springs, Wyoming to Ogden, Utah, for
the Wayne Rasmussen Company. Thereafter he filed a
claim with the Industrial Commission of Utah for benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Statutes. The first
hearing was held before the Industrial Commission on
October 17, 1956. At that hearing it was stipulated
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between the parties that the sole issue to be determined
was whether or not there was a contract of employment
existing between the Defendant, Wayne Rasmussen Company, and the plaintiff, Sherman S. Dalton. (R. 11). On
October 9, 1957, plaintiff's recommended findings of fact
and conclusions of law were adopted by the Industrial
Commission. (R. 71, 72, 73). The Commission found
that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and
the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injuries arose out
of or in the course of his employment. (R. 72) . On
November 12, 1957, defendant filed a petition for rehearing to redetermine the question of whether or not there
was a contract of employment existing between the plaintiff and defendant and to determine if the medical expenses
incurred by the applicant were reasonable. (R. 77). On
November 26, 1957, the Commission ordered that the
application for rehearing be granted. (R. 78). The rehearing was held on February 10, 1958. On April 2,
19 58, the Commission reversed its former holding and
found that the plaintiff was not an employee of the Wayne
Rasmussen Company, but was either a volunteer or an
independent contractor. The Commission entered the
following decision:
((The above entitled cause came on regularly
for hearing at Salt Lake City, Utah, on October
17, 1956 at 10:00 o'clock A.M., before the Industrial Commission of Utah, pursuant to Order
and Notice of the Commission. Applicant was
present and represented by John L. Black, attorney;
defendants were present and represented by Grant
C. Aadnesen, attorney.
A further hearing was held at Salt Lake City,
Utah, on February 10, 1958, at 9:00 o'clock A.M.
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The attorneys above mentioned represented the
parties.
On October 9, 19 57 the Commission made an
award in favor of applicant. Subsequently, defendants filed a Petition for Rehearing which was
granted by formal Order of the Commission on
November 26, 1957. It was stipulated that the
transcript of the first hearing should be made a part
of the record on rehearing.
Two issues were submitted on rehearing, first,
whether or not the applicant was an employee of
defendant, Wayne Rasmussen Company on February 13, 19 55, and, second, the reasonableness of
the medical and hospital bills submitted to defendants for payment. The· second issue was not
considered at the first hearing.
We have carefully reviewed the testimony
submitted at the first hearing and studied the
memoranda filed by counsel.
The $25.00 paid to applicant and his partner
was, we believe, expense money rather than wages.
In all respects, this case is on all fours with the
Oberhansly case. Therefore, we hold that Oherhansly v. Travelers Insurance Co., 295 P.2d 1093,
5 Utah 2d 15 is controlling.
We therefore find that applicant was not
an employee of defendant, Wayne Rasmussen Company on February 13, 1955, the date of the accident and injury, but that he was either a volunteer
or an independent contractor.
IT IS THEREFORE O·RDERED. that the
application is denied." (R. 96).
Plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing on April 23, 1957
(R. 97). This petition was denied by the Industrial
Commission on July 17, 1957 (R. 126).
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In view of the rule that the decision of the Commission will not be disturbed if supported by any substantial
evidence, and in order to assist the court, we feel it necessary to restate the facts of the case.
Dalton and a Mr. Porter owned and operated an
automobile parts and body shop. Although they leased
the back part of a building owned by the Wayne Rasmussen Company, they operated their business entirely independent of the Wayne Rasmussen Company.
Wayne Rasmussen Company held the Studebaker
franchise in Ogden, Utah. Part of the business of the
Wayne Rasmussen Company was buying and selling used
cars. (R. 46). When the new car business slowed up a
little, Wayne Rasmussen Company would buy used cars
in Idaho, Wyoming, New Mexico or Arizona and bring
them back to Utah. (R. 47). The cars were driven to
Utah by various people. (R. 48). Purkey, office manager
and bookkeeper for Wayne Rasmussen Company and the
Porter Dalton partnership, testified:

uQ. Do you know what people were used, in the
past to obtain these cars and drive them back?
A. Well, we had a Mr. A. J. Hansen and Scotty
Metheny. They had been there for several years
with Mr. Rasmussen as salesmen and, if the business slowed up a little, in the new business, then we
went out and tried to pick up something to make
some n1oney in the used car business and sometimes they would buy them themselves and bring
them back or get somebody to help them bring
them back. Then there would be other times that
Mr. Rasmussen would go and bring them, and
sometimes Metheny and Hansen would go pick
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them \lP or take someone with them to pick them
up.
*~··*

Q. And do you know of any other employees,
other than the two you have mentioned, that were
ever sent to bring cars in?

A. Well no, other than Mr. Dalton and Mr. Porter .
. Q. On this occasion that we have talked about
today?
A. Yes, then we had others, that l can't remember
their names. They were short-term ·employees,
see." (R. 46, 47, 48)
On or about February 11, 1955, Naylor, the Sales
Manager for Wayne Rasmussen Company, approached
Dalton and asked him if he and his partner, Porter, could
go to- Rock Springs, Wyoming, to drive two cars hack to
Ogden, Utah (R. 16). Naylor told Dalton he had a
((deal" with somebody to get the cars but that they weren't
going to go and that it had caused an emergency (R. 16).
Purkey who was present during the conversation between
Naylor and Dalton relative to picking up the cars, testified:
((Mr. Naylor had these two cars up there and
he thought that he had some other parties to go get
them. Well, I believe it was Friday afternoon or
Saturday morning, I can't remember which, that
these other parties called him up and said they
couldn't go. So Mr. Naylor was worried about
who he could get and I believe that Jack came up,
Mr. Dalton came up into the parts or to the front
of the office and Mr. Naylor told him that he had
ell,
these two cars there, and Mr. Dalton said,
we will go get them." I don't remember just when
that was, whether that was Friday or Saturday, but

rrw
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anyway the arrangements was made that they
should go get them and I was to give them a check
for $25.00." (R. 49-50). (Italics ours)
On Saturday, February 12th, Dalton told Naylor
that he and his partner could go get the cars. (R. 17).
Naylor made arrangements for transportation by bus to
Rock Springs because it was Saturday morning and Dalton
was too busy to get away and make the arrangements.
(R. 17). Naylor told Dalton the departure and arrival
time of the bus, where the garage in Rock Springs was
located, to have the cars :filled with gas and to charge it
to Wayne Rasmussen Company, and if they had any
trouble on the way to pay for It and they would be reimbursed for the money spent. (R. 18) . Naylor gave Dalton
a check for $25.00 (R. 18). Dalton bought the bus
tickets out of the $25.00 for himself and Porter. (R. 18).
Dalton and Porter caught the bus in Ogden, Utah, at 2:00
or 3:00 p.m. on Saturday afternoon. They arrived in
Rock Springs at 7:00 p.m. that night, and went to the
garage where the cars were located. (R. 19, 20}. Dalton
signed the tickets for the gasoline which had been put in
the cars and then he and Porter went to a cafe to eat. (R.
20). After they finished eating Dalton and Porter started
for Ogden, each driving a separate car. Somewhere between Rock Springs and Evanston, Wyoming, they had
a quart of oil put in one of the cars (R. 38). When they
arrived in Evanston they stopped at the Freeman Hotel
and had a cup of coffee and rested a few minutes, and then
proceeded on to Ogden (R. 20) . About 18 miles west of
Evanston the plaintiff's car hit some ice on the road, went
into a spin and sideswiped a telephone pole, which resulted
in plaintiff's injuries.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
APPELLENT WAS A VOLUNTEER OR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL CO·MMISSION GRANTED
THE REHEARING FO·R THE EXPRESS PURPOSE
OF REDETERMINING THE EMPLOYER-EMPLO·YEE
RELATIONSHIP AND REASO·NABLENESS OF THE
MEDICAL EXPENSES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS A VOLUNTEER OR AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
Section 35-1-85 of the U.C.A. 1953, states:
35-1-85. Duty of commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law-Filing-Conclusiveness on questions of fact-Review-Court
judgment.-After each formal hearing, it shall be
the duty of the commission to make findings of
fact and conclusions of law in writing and file the
same with its secretary. The findings and conclusions of the com.mission on questions of fact
shall be conclusive and final and sh'all not be subject to review; such questions of fact shall include
ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of
the c01'1'1J11tission. The commission and every party
to the action or proceeding before the commission
shall have the right to appear in the review proceeding. Upon the hearing the court shall enter
judgment either affirming or setting aside the
award. (Italics ours)
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Under this sect!ott and the rule often enunciated by
this Supreme Court, the findings and conclusions of the
Commission should be sustained where there is substantial
evidence to support them. Commission of Finance v.
Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 83, 239 P.2d 185;
Camacho v. Industrial Commission, 119 Utah 181, 225
P.2d. 728.
In the case at bar the commission made the following
findings and conclusions:
uThe $25.00 paid to applicant and his partner
was, we believe, expense money rather than wages.
In all respects, this case is on all fours with the
Oberhansly case. Therefore, we hold that Oberhansly v. Travelers Insurance Co., 295 P.2d 1093,
5 Utah 2d 15, is controlling.
We therefore find that applicant was not an
employee of defendant, Wayne Rasmussen COmpany on February 13, 1955, the date of the accident and injury, but that he was either a volunteer
or an independent contractor." (R. 96)
Plaintiff has assailed the findings and conclusions of the
Commission. Although they are binding on this court,
we will discuss them to show that Dalton was a volunteer
and even if he was not a volunteer, he must of necessity
have been an independent contractor.
The case at bar is controlled by Oberhansly v. Travelers Insurance Company, 5 Utah 2d 15, 295 P.2d 1093.
In that case the plaintiff, Verne J. Oberhansly, obtained
a judgment against LaMar Pearce and LaMar Pearce Auto
Mart, a corporation, for personal injuries sustained while
riding in a car driven by LaMar Pearce, president of the
LaMar Pearce Auto Mart. Being unable to collect the judg-
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ment because of the involvency of both LaMar Pearce and
the company, Oberhansly brought suit to collect it from
Travelers Insurance Company. Travelers had issued its
standard comprehensive liability policy which was in force
at the time of the accident to the LaMar Pearce Auto Mart.
Judgment. in the lower court was for the plaintiff and the
defendant appealed. Travelers attempted to avoid its
liability under the policy on two grounds:

cc ( 1) That respondent was an employee of the
LaMar Pear,ce Auto Mart, or was such under the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
of this state and therefore expressly excluded under
the terms of the policy, and (2) that the insured
failed to cooperate with the insurer in defense of
the action against it in violation of the terms of the
p·olicy."
The court stated as to point No. I (P. 1094) :
ccAs to No. 1, the evidence was uncontradicted
that respondent was regularly engaged in a business
of his own in no way connected with the LaMar
Pearce Auto Mart, but that respondent's brother
was connected with the company under what
LaMar Pearce called a partnership agreement, and
therefore on a few occasions before the occurrence
of the accident on which this suit is based, had, as a
favor to this brother, driven cars to Idaho for
the company and had neither asked nor received
compensation or even expenses for those trips.
The company was in financial difficulties and on
the day the accident occurred, respondent was
called and asked if he would drive one of two cars
which the company had decided to return to a
consignor in Evanston, Wyoming. He consented
to do so if the expenses were paid by the company •
and LaMar Pearce gave him $10 for this. The $10
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was spent for gasoline for all the cars driven on
this trip and. for meals· and refreshments. LaMar
Pearce testified that although he had never exer. cised any control over the activities of respondent
' on the few occasions when he had delivered cars
for the company, he felt that if he had seen him
drive in a manner which could result in damage
to the car bein·g returned he could tell him not to
do so as the cars were his responsibility. Although
the company maintained Workmen's Compensation insurance, respondent was not reported as an
employee on any reports concerning its employees.
From this evidence the court found that respondent
was not an employee of the insured at the time
of the accident within the meaning of that word
as used in the policy, nor was the insured liable
under any Workmen's Compensation law for the
injuries received by respondent. We agree with
the court's findings. The evidence is conclusive
that neither LaMar Pearce, who was representing
the company, nor respondent understood that respondent had been hired to drive the car to
Evanston, Wyoming. The act was considered by
all parties concerned to be a voluntary accommodation. Pearce did not have the right to direct respondent in the manner in which he wished the
work to be accomplished. He could not discharge
him for a refusal to do as directed. There was no
agreement to pay wages or salary. The $10.00
was given for expenses and not as compensation
for work."
The facts in the case at bar are on all fours with the facts of
the Oberhansly case.
In the Oberhansly case the respondent was asked to
drive a car to Evanston, Wyoming, because the company
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was in financial difficulty. In the case at bar the plaintiff
volunteered (R. 49) or was asked (R.I6) to drive a car
from Rock Springs, Wyoming to Ogden, Utah, because
of an emergency. In both cases the driving was done as
a voluntary accommodation. In both cases the individuals
volunteering to drive the cars were regularly engaged in
a business of their own. In both cases the individuals doing
the driving were not reported as employees of the companies for whom they were driving (R. 53-54). In the
Oberhansly case, Pearce, the president of the Auto Mart,
did not have the right to direct Oberhansly in the manner
in which he wished the work to be accomplished. Pearce
could not discharge Ober~ansly for ref~sal to do as directed. There was no agreement for Pearce to pay Ober-.
hansly a salary or wage. In the case at bar, neither Rasmussen nor Naylor had the right to direct Dalton in the
manner in which he wanted the driving to be done. Neither
Rasmussen nor Naylor could discharge Dalton for refusal
to do as directed and there was no agreement to pay wages
or salary. In the Oberhansly case the $10.00 given to
Oberhansly was given for expenses and not as wages. It
was spent for gasoline, meals and refreshments. In the
case at bar, the $25.00 was given for expenses and was
spent for bus tickets (R. 41), meals (R. 20), refreshments (R. 20) and a quart of oil (R. 3 8).
In the Oberhansly case this court restated the test
announced in Bingham City Corp. v. Industrial Com.mission, 66 Utah 390, 243 P. 113, to determine whether a
workman is an employee:
ccThe usual test by which to determine whether
one person is another's employee is whether the
alleged employer possesses the power to control the
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other person in respect to the services performed
by the latter and the power to discharge him for
disobedience or misconduct. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act it is also essential that
some consideration be in fact paid or payable to
the employee. The purpose of the act is to provide
compensation for earning power, lost in industry,
and the only basis for computing compensation is
the earning ability of the employee in the particular employment out of which the loss arises. In
short, the term remployee' indicates a person hired
to work for wages as the employer may direct.
* * *" (Italics ours)
The court concluded its discussion of whether Oberhansly was an employee of the LaMar Pearce Auto Mart
by stating:
ult is clear from all the evidence that there
was a reasonable basis for the court to :find there
was no employee-employer relationship between
respondent and the insured either under the ordinary meaning of those terms or under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the court did not
err in so finding.''
Appellant has attempted to distinguish the Oberhansly case from the case at bar on the ground that the
$10.00 given to Oberhansly was for expenses while the
$25.00 given to Dalton and Porter was for wages. Appellant would have this court believe that if any of the $25.00
was remaining after Dalton had purchased a bus ticket,
a meal, refreshments and a quart of oil that it must follow
that Dalton was an employee. This court has never limited the test of the employer-employee relationship to such
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a narrow premise. The test previously announced by this
court to ascertain if a relationship is that of employeremployee is to determine whether the alleged employer
possesses the right to .control the other person in respect
to the manner and method of the service performed.

Bingham City Corp. v. Industrial Commission, supra.
The manner and basis of payment is one element to
be used in determining whether there is an employeremployee relationship. Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 99 Utah 423, 107 P.2d 1027. The $25.00
given to Dalton was for expenses. The record is silent as
to what amount, if any, was left from the $25.00 after
Dalton had purchased a bus ticket, dinner, refreshments
and a quart of oil. Even if there was some balance remaining from the $25.00, that amount would not be a
wage. The appellant has failed to show that the evidence
preponderates against the conclusion of the Commission
that the $25.00 was to be used for expenses rather than
wages. That the parties did not consider the $25.00 as a
wage is shown by Purkey's statement that the money
Dalton and Porter received was not reported as income
on their final statement at the end of the year. (R. 63).
Appellant has also attempted to distinguish the Oherhansly case on the ground that Oberhansly rendered a
service as a favor and a gratuity while Dalton performed
a service for wages. The record in the case at bar supports
the finding of the Commission that Dalton rendered a
service as a voluntary accommodation.
Purkey testified that when Dalton was informed that
two cars were in Rock Springs he volunteered frw ell, we
will go get them." (Italics ours) (R. 49).
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This statement corroborates the Commission's finding
that Dalton performed this job of his own free will.
The record does not support plaintiff's contention
that Dalton's decision to go to Rock Springs to get the
cars was motivated by a promise of remuneration. Porter's
motive for going on the trip was given in response to a
question concerning the possibility of his going to Rock
Springs to purchase a used car for his own purpose. He
stated:
nwe went on several trips and it was easy to
tell my wife we were going to look at a car if we
were going to go out on a binge. And that's the
truth of it." (R. 65)
It is important to observe that Porter's statement was
framed in the plural and obviously included himself as
well as Dalton. It is also important to note that the statement was made while Porter was being questioned as an
adverse witness. This statement was given in response to
a question concerning his prior statement that he went to
Rock Springs to purchase a used car for his own purpose.
Dalton and Porter apparently had reasons of their own
for going to Rock Springs. It might have been to purchase
used cars for their own purposes or ugo out on a binge."
From the testimony in the record, the Commission could
find uthat's the truth of it."
From the foregoing it is evident that both Porter and
Dalton were volunteers.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Dalton was
not a volunteer, then it must follow that he was an independent .contractor and not an employee. Section 35-1-42,
U.C.A. 1953, defines the terms of employee and independent contractor:
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~Where any employer procures any work
to be done wholly or in part for hi:fll by a contractor
H ••

over whose work he retains supervision or control,
and such work is a part of process in the trade or
business of the employer, such contractor, and all
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors
under him, and all persons employed by any such
subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees 'of such original
employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged in the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed· an employer
within the meaning of this section. The term fin-

dependent contractor,' as herein used, is defined
to be any person, association or corporation engaged
in the performance of any work for another, who,
while so engaged, is independent of the employer
·in all that pertains to the execution of the work,
is not subject to the rule or control of the employer,
is engaged only in the performance of a definite
job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with
the employer's design." (Italics ours)
This court has interpreted this language in a number
of cases.

In Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 U tab
309, 172 P. 2d 136, this .court stated:
({From these definitions (given in 35-1-42,
U.C.A. 1953) it is apparent that whether a workman is an (employee' or an (independent contractor' is dependent on (I) whether the employer
has the right to control his execution of the work,
( 2) whether the work done or to be done is a part
or process in the trade or business of the employer,
and (3) whether the work done or to be done is a
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definite job or piece of work. (The word (employer' as used in this opinion refers to the person
who is having work done, whether the person doing
the work is an (employee' or an (independent contractor.')
The court further held that the most important determinative of the relationship between workman and employer is that of control.
In Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049, this
court applied the right to control test. The question before the court was whether a husband who was riding in
a car driven by his wife and owned by them jointly had
the legal right of control. It was held to be a fact question. The court stated at page 1051:
((Control as applied to the operation of an automobile may be broken down into its elementsthe when, the where, and the how. Complete
control means that the principal could dictate
when the car was to be used, the destination or
where it should go, the route it should take, and
how it should be driven, whether slow or fast,
behind or around traffic, inside or outside the lane
of traffic, etc. It is not necessary that the principal
should be physically able to so direct or control,
but only that he has the right to."
The test used in the Fox case is the same test that
should be applied in the case at bar.
The Wayne Rasmussen Company had no right to
dictate when Dalton drove the car back to Ogden. He
could have stayed in Rock Springs Saturday night if he
had desired and returned to Ogden the next morning or
even Sunday evening. If Dalton had decided not to go,
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neither Naylor nor Rasmussen had any authority to order
him to go. The fact that Naylor made transportation
arrangements for Dalton to Rock Springs does not in any
way give him the right to direct when the cars were to
be returned. Assuming that Naylor had gone to Rock
Springs with Dalton, he had no legal right to tell Dalton
when he had to drive the car back to Ogden. The very
nature of the act-driving a car from Rock Sp·rings,
Wyoming to Ogden, Utah-was the kind of a job which
indicates that Dalton, and not the Wayne Rasmussen
Company, had the right to determine when he returned
to Ogden.
The company did not have the legal right to direct
Dalton where to drive the car. Dalton testified that
there was only one highway going west out of Rock
Springs and that was U.S. #30 (R. 20). Assuming that
there were a number of routes from Rock Springs to
Ogden, the Wayne Rasmussen Company had no legal
right to tell Dalton which one he should take. Dalton
was to bring a car back to Ogden, Utah. He had the right
to determine the route, not the Wayne Rasmussen Company. (Italics ours). See Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, supra (where this Court held there was no right
to direct route of travel where there was only one direct
rout~ available).
The company had no right to direct Dalton in the
manner in which he drove the car. Dalton had the right
to determine how he drove the automobile, ((whether slow
or fast, behind or around traffic, inside or outside the
lane of traffic, etc." Fox v. Lavender, supra.
In the Fox case this court said that uwhen there is a
paucity of facts from which any inference as to agency
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or the lack of it can be had, (the) resolution may depend
entirely upon -presumptions." This court stated that
Utah falls within that line of authorities which hold that
no presumption of agency arises that ·the -driver·. of the
car is the agent of the owner ·where the owner is not
present in the automobile. Ferguson vs. Reynolds, 52
Utah 583, 176 P. 267; McFarlane vs. Winters, 47 Utah
598, 155 P. 437.

This court in the Fox case discussed the object of the
journey as it relates to the question of control. · This court
said at page 1052:
uTherefol:"e, the ultimate object of what is to
be done at the end of the journey is not controlling,
but simply a circumstance to throw light upon the
question of whether there was the right of control
during the journey. The inquiry must still be- directed as to whether an agency existed in the operation of the car, or the more fundamental question
of whether there was the right of control on the
part of another during the time the car was operated."
Applying the right to control test it is apparent that
the Wayne Rasmussen Company did not have the legal
right to control the when, the where and the how of the
operation of the automobile. (Italics ours) This is a factual
question which the Commission resolved in favor of the
defendants. The record supports the decision of the
Commission and preponderates against the contentions of
the plaintiff.
The second test enunciated in the Parkinson case, supra
is uwhether the work done or to be done is a part of process in the trade or business of the employer.... "
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In the Parkinson case supra the workman, Molyneaux,
seeking· compensation, was engaged in the independent
calling of a trucker. Molyneaux made arrangements with
one Parkinson, the receiver for W oolsulate, Inc. to haul
sufficient coke to keep the ·Company supplied at all times.
W oolsulate, Inc. was engaged in the business of manufacturing insulation. Molyneaux was required to haul a
minimum of 3 5 tons of coke per _week but he could haul
additional amounts as he desired, limited only by the company's coke storage capacity.
This court found that the work done by Molyneaux
was not a part or process in the trade or business of Woolsul~te, Inc. The court said at page 140:

uwoolsulate was in the business of manufacturing insulation. The record does not show that
it was in the transportation or trucking business.
It required coke for its business just as it required
raw materials for its products. Some of the coke
was delivered to it by railroad and some by truck.
The company was primarily interested in obtaining
the coke on time and having it deposited at convenient places. How or when the coke was hauled,
whether by large truck or small, by day or night,
by direct or circuitous route, etc., was immaterial
to it so long as it always had readily available sufficient coke to operate its plant."
The act of transporting cars, whether new or used,
to the Wayne Rasmussen Company in Ogden, Utah, was
not a ((part or process in the trade or business" of Wayne
Rasmussen Company. Wayne Rasmussen Company was
in the business of selling cars. There is no evidence that
it was in the transportation business. It required cars for
its business just as W oolsulate required coke and raw mate-
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rials for its products. The Wayne Rasmussen Company
was primarily interested in obtaining used cars when
business in the new car market slowed up a little (R. 47).
How or when the cars were transported, whether by day
or night, by direct or circuitous route, was immaterial so
long as the Wayne Rasmussen Company had used cars
to sell when the sale of new cars declined.
The shipment of new cars to the Wayne Rasmussen
Company would not be considered a part or proce5s of
Rasmussen's business of selling cars and likewise the transporting of used cars is not part of the trade or business
of selling. The fact that Rasmussen's salesmen as well as
others picked up the cars and drove them back to Ogderi
does not make the work done part of the business of Rasmussen. The salesmen were employed to sell cars and not
transport cars to Ogden.
If transporting coke is not a part of the business of
manufacturing insulation, then it reasonably follows that
transporting cars is not a p~rt of the business of selling
cars.
The third test enunciated by this court in the Parkinson case is whether the work done or to be done is a
definite job or piece of work. It is obvious that the work
done by Dalton was a definite job.
In a number of Utah cases, this Court has found a
workman to be an independent contractor because of the
absence of control by the employer and because the workma.n was to do a definite piece of work. (Italics ours) In
Kinder v. Industrial Com1nissi01t, 106 Utah 448, 150
P.2d 109, this Court held a workman to be an independent
contractor. The court found that the workman hauled
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gravel in a truck owned by a third person and the Gravel
Company paid the workman an agreed sum per yard for
the gravel hauled, and gave him no directions as to the
route to be travelled, the hours of work, the speed of the
truck, or number of loads to be hauled per week or month,
and exercised no control over his work except the right
to direct. where to load and unload the gravel. In Luker
Sand & Gravel Co., v. Industrial Commission, 82 Utah 188,
23 P.2d 225, this Court found a workman to be an independent contractor where the workman contracted to dig
a foundation for a building at a fixed price and to haul
gravel for a fixed charge per load. In Angel v. Industrial
Commission, 64 Utah 105, 228 P. 509, this Court held a
workman to be an independent contractor where the
workman contracted to pour cement at a certain price
per cubic foot, and whose work was supervised by the
contractor only to the extent of satisfying himself that it
was done in a workmanlike manner as the work progressed. In Gogoff v. Industrial Commission, 77 Utah 355,
296 P. 229, this court held a workman to be an independent contractor where he contracted to drill tunnels
in a quarry. Applying the tests recited by this court in
the Parkinson case supra to the case at bar, it is evident
that Dalton was an independent contractor and not an
employee.

In Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113, Utah 451,
196 P.2d 502; the court was confronted with the question of whether Christean was an employee or an independent contractor. This court considered it desirable
to test the facts of the case with the factors set forth in
the Restatement of the Law of Agency, paragraph 220,
page 48 3, which are as follows:
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.
u ( 1) A servant is a person employed to perform service for another in his affairs and who,
with respect to this physical conduct
the per...
· formance of the service, is subject to the other's
control or right to control.

m

(( ( 2) In determining whether one acting for
another is a servant or an independent contractor,
the following ,matters of fact, among others, are
considered:

((a. The extent of control which, by the agreement, the master. may exercise over the details of
the work;
((b. whether or not the employed is engaged
in a distinct occupation or business;
((c. the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a specialist. without supervision;
((d. the skill required in the particular occupation;
((e. whether the employer or the workman
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place
of work for the person doing the work;
((f. the length of time for which the person
is employed;
ug. the method of payment, whether by the
time or by the job;
uh. whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer; and
ui. whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relationship of master and servant."
In applying the foregoing tests to the facts of the
case at bar, it is apparent that:
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u (a) the defendant had no cont~ol ov:er the
details of the applicant's work;
~c (b) the applicant is in a distinct business,
namely, the automobile repair business;
u (c)
transporting· automobiles does not require ~ ~pecialist, but it is generally done without
SU perVlSlOn;
cc (d) transporting automobiles does not require any special skill;
cc (e). the defendant supplied the automobile,
but not the place of work;
u (f) the fact that the job was to be completed in 12 to 18 hours indicates that it was a very
short duration;
cc (g)
the method of payment, if any, was for
the job and not by the hour; (Italics ours)
u (h) the work is not part of the regular business of the defendant, as he is in the business of
selling new and used cars and not transporting
automobiles;
cc (i) there is no indication as to what relationship the parties intended to create."
Applying Criteria (a), (b), (f), (g), and (h) to the
case at bar shows the Wayne Rasmussen Company did not
have the right of control over Dalton.
The various tests previously applied by this court have
been used as aids in determining the primary question of
whether the employer has the right to control the workmen. A careful reading of the record shows beyond any
doubt that the defendant did not have the right to control
the plaintiff in the work he did and was only interested
in the result-the arrival of the cars in Ogden.
The appellant contends that the job done by Dalton
and Porter was one ((which was regularly and most usually
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performed by regular employees for a wage." The record
does not support this assertion. Purkey, bookkeeper for
the two companies, stated that sometimes Metheny and
Hansen brought in the used cars, sometimes they get others
to do it, other times, Mr. Rasmussen brought them in, and
then there were other ((short-term employees". who were
sent to bring the cars in. (R. 47, 48)
When Naylor told Dalton he had two cars in Rock
Springs, Naylor said he had a deal with ((somebody" to
get them and they weren't going to, and it had caused an
emergency. (R. 16)
There is no evidence in the record that Metheny
and Hansen were going to Rock Springs and Dalton
and Porter were asked to take their place. The record is
silent as to the identity of the usomebody" who was to
pick up the cars. There is no showing in the record
whatsoever as to whether these other people were regular
employees or not. Dalton and. Porter did not step into the
shoes of regular employees and do their job.
The plaintiff has cited two cases which are allegedly
analogous on their facts; Southern Pacific Company v.
Industrial Co1nnzission, 71 Utah 248, 264 P. 965, and
Utah Fire Clay Company v. Industrial Commission, 86
Utah, 1, 40 P.2d 183. The facts in the Southern Pacific
case are clearly distinguishable from the facts at bar. There
the applicant was u:... :.'- * orally employed by the company's foreman of the section to cut the weeds at a daily
wage of $6.50, he to furnish, as he did, his own team and
mower; that he received instructions from the foreman
as to the particular place to work; that his work was extended as in the judgment of the foreman the weed cutting
along the right of way was needed; that he was subject
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to discharge at the will or direction of the foreman; that
the foreman or roadmaster of the company directed Surrage where to start cutting, and when to change to other
places· of the work; that a separate pay roll was kept for
him and when he was injured, the foreman employed another to finish the work."
These facts clearly show an. employee-employer relationship and are not. similar to the facts at bar.
In the Utah Fire Clay Company case supra, the facts
again show an employer-employee relationship and are
not similar to the case at bar. Here the evidence indicated that the applicant had been driving a truck engaged
in work for Utah Fire Clay for six or seven years; that
the Fire Clay Company cc* * * controlled the actions of
said drivers and directed them in the work they were to
do, where they were to go, when they were to come to
work, when they were through work, whether or not
they could take vacations, what articles they were to haul
and deliver, and when and where; that the said drivers
returned after each trip to the Utah Fire Clay COmpany's
plant for further orders and directions; the truck drivers
had no right or option to refuse to do any of these things
or to follow any directions given them by the Utah Fire
Clay Company; that the Utah Fire Clay Company was
the exclusive judge of when its work should be done by
the truck drivers and the manner in which it should be
done." Here the right to control the workman was obviously retained by the employer.
The plaintiff has also cited Plewe Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 373, 242 P. 2d
561, as a recent Utah case dealing with the question of
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whether a workman is an employee or an independent
contractor.
In the Plewe case, supra, the.Plewe Construction Company hired two roofers to shingle a roof. The two roofers
employed a third man to expedite the work. The third
man was injured when he fell from the roof. That the
Plewe Construction Company retained the right to. control and did control the workmen in the labors is demonstrated by the evidence. This court said:
u* * * the Plewe Construction Company furnished all the materials, decided where they were
to be placed, told the workmen how to place the
shingles and when to split them and to draw chalk
lines before putting on the shingles so as to ensure
straight lines."
These cases involve factual situations where the employer clearly retained the right to control the workmen.
In the case at bar, the Wayne Rasmussen Company did
not retain the right to control Dalton in the service he performed.
POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION GRANTED
THE REHEARING FOR THE PURPOSE OF REDETERMINING EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP AND THE REASONABLENESS OF THE
MEDICAL EXPENSES.
After the Industrial Commission rendered its initial
decision on October 9, 1957, defendants petitioned the
court for a rehearing to uredetermine the question of
whether or not there was a contract of employment existing between the defendant Wayne Rasmussen Company,
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and applicant, Sherman S. Dalton at the time the applicant
suffered the injuries complained of/' (R. 77) Defendants
also requested the rehearing to. deternline if the medical expenses incurred by the applicant were reasonable. The
petition for rehearing was filed November 12, 1957.
On December 4, 1957, counsel for plaintiff filed an
argpment in opposition to rehearing. In this argument
counsel acknowledged that the rehearing had been requested for the purpose. of having the commission redetermine the employment question as well as the reasonableness of the medical expenses. His argument was
addressed to both questions. On December 5th, the Industrial Commission wrote an ex parte letter to counsel for
plaintiff informing him that the transcript contained no
evidence regarding medical and hospital expenses and in
this case there had been a large bill submitted to defendants.
The letter further stated ccThey (defendants) are entitled
to have the Commission determine this issue."
The rehearing was held on February 10, 1958. At
the rehearing the commission made the following statement:
uThis case was heard on October 17, 1956,
and award was made by the Commission October
9, 1957.
The petition for rehearing was filed November
12, 1957. Order granting the rehearing November 26, 1957.
This is a hearing de novo, gentlemen, and I
assume that you're willing to stipulate that the
transcript of the proceedings of the O·ctober 17,
1956, hearing may be received in evidence?
Mr. Aadnesen: So stipulated.
Mr. Black: So stipulate, your Honor.
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The Commissioner: Now, the defendants .asked
for a rehearing for the purpose ·of determining
the reasonableness of the medical expenses claimed
by the applicant, and defendants also question the
employer-employee relationship. I understand the
defendants have filed a memorandum. Is that on
this question of employment?
. Mr. Aadnesen: That's. the employment question.
The Commissioner: You want some time to
answer that, Mr. Black?
Mr. Black: Yes, I would.
The Commissioner: How long?
Mr. Black: Well, twenty days.
The Commissioner: All right. The counsel
for applicant will be given twenty days to :file a
reply memorandum to the memorandum of the
defendant. (R. 84, 85) .
You may proceed, Mr. Aadnesen."
At the rehearing, the commissioner stated that the
proceeding was a hearing de 11ovo. Counsel for plaintiff
stipulated that the transcript of proceedings of October
17, 1956 could be introduced in evidence. Counsel for
plaintiff did not object to the proceeding being a hearing
de novo nor to the fact that the commissioner stated that
the rehearing was for the purpose of determining the
reasonableness of the medical expenses and the employeeemployer relationship nor to the introduction of the
transcript of proceedings of October 17, 1956. By falling to make any objections to the proceedings at the time
the rehearing was held, counsel for plaintiff waived his
objections.
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The order granting the rehearing did not limit the
issues. The order stated:
((IT IS ORDERED that the request for Rehearing filed herein by defendant's attorney on the
12th day of November, 1957, be, and the same is
hereby granted." (R. 78)
In Carter v. Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 520,
290 P. 776, at 783 this court stated:
«The effect of granting the rehearing, unless
otherwise restricted or limited, was to vacate and
set aside the prior order or judgment of the commission and try the case anew."
That the Commission intended to reconsider the application in its entirety is apparent from the statement of
the Commission that the proceeding was a hearing de novo.
Defendant complied with the law in :filing its application for rehearing. The Utah statute regarding rehearing
is as follows:
35-1-82. Rehearing before commission.Any party including the commission of :finance to
a proceeding before the commission may, and before he can seek a review in the Supreme COurt
shall, within thirty days after written notice of
its decision file an application before the commission for a rehearing of the matter.
In Pinyon Queen Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 3~3, counsel for the applicant
moved that the record and proceedings returned by the
Industrial Commission on rehearing be stricken for the
reason that no notice of application for rehearing was
ever served upon the applicant or his counsel and no op-
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portunity was ever given the applicant to be heard respecting the motion for rehearing.
In response to the contention this court stated:

(P. 324)
((There is no formal hearing on a motion for
rehearing, and when a petition for rehearing is
pending it is properly disposed of ex parte. If
denied, the adverse party has no cause for complaint, and, if granted, the parties are given notice
of the rehearing, as was done in the instant case,
by the Commission. The statute provides that the
Industrial Commission shall not be bound by any
technical or formal rules of procedure other than
in the statute provided. Notice of the hearing on
the petition for rehearing is not provided by the
statute and no valid reason has been given why
such notice should be required by the Commission.
After the rehearing was granted, applicant was
given notice of the second hearing, and thus all
his rights were fully protected."
After the rehearing was granted in the case at bar,
plaintiff was given notice of the date for the rehearing and
thus all his rights were fully protected.
CONCLUSION
The record supports the order of the Commission
that Dalton was either a volunteer or an independent contractor. The $25.00 given to Dalton and Porter was for
expenses and not for wages. Even if this court should
:find that Dalton was not a volunteer, then it must follow
that he was an independent contractor.
This court has previously stated that the most important of the determinatives of the relationship between em-
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ployer and workman is that of control. In determining
whether the right to control exists all the facts and circumstances of the relationship must be examined. Control
broken down into its elements includes the when, the
where and the how. Dalton had the right to determine
when he returned to Ogden, where he drove, and how he
drove, whether fast or slow, behind or around traffic and
whether on the inside or outside lane of traffic. (Italics
ours). Under the right to control test and the other tests
announced by this court, Dalton was not an employee of
the Wayne Rasmussen Company at the time he was
injured. The appellant has failed to show that the record
preponderates against the ·Conclusion of the Commission.
The petition for rehearing requested the Commission
to redetermine the question of whether there was an employee-employer relationship existing between Dalton and
the Wayne Rasmussen Company at the time Dalton was
injured. The order granting the rehearing did not limit
the issues. When the rehearing was held the Commissioner
stated that the proceeding was a hearing de novo to determine if there was an employee-employer relationship and
if the medical expenses were reasonable. Counsel for
plaintiff did not object to the Commissioner's statement
and having failed to oppose that action he has waived his
objections.
The denial of compensation should be affirmed.

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
GRANT C. AADNESEN,
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER
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